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Abstract: 
 
This study analyzes the impact of cross-border acquisitions of US Telecom 
Operators on the shareholder value and firm performance. We analyzed the 
value implications of 33 acquisitions made by US Telecommunication 
companies in 18 countries located in North America, Europe, Latin America 
and Asia Pacific.  While 15 of the target companies were domiciled in 
developed countries, 18 were located in Latin American and Asian emerging 
markets.  Total value of acquisitions included in the sample was $12.3bn with 
a mean transaction value of  $363.8m. Our small sample analyses revealed 
that cross-border acquisitions of US Telecom companies on the average did 
not create value for the shareholders.  We also could not identify any 
significant performance improvements in the post acquisition period.  An 
interesting result of our empirical analysis was the finding that acquisitions 
of targets in emerging markets generated higher cumulative abnormal 
returns than the targets in developed country markets.  
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Introduction 
 
A combination of environmental forces ranging from technological 
innovations, deregulation, privatization and liberalization to a number of 
firm level drivers have dramatically shifted the dynamics of 
telecommunications industry and triggered rapid globalization. Economies of 
scale and strategic considerations prompted telecom service providers to 
aggressively pursue international opportunities in an increasingly open 
market that traditionally used to be reserved for national monopolies.  Facing 
imminent challenges in this transient industry, US telecom companies 
developed a range of strategic responses from domestic and international 
alliances to expanding operations internationally, leveraging their existing 
capabilities and expertise.  The objective of this paper is to evaluate the 
impact of cross-border expansion of US telecom service providers on the 
shareholder wealth during 1990s.   
 
Telecom globalization has been driven by a set of environmental and 
institutional forces such as technological innovations, deregulation, 
privatization and liberalization (Sarkar, Cavusgil and Aulakh, 1999).  
  
The telecommunications industry has been revolutionized by explosive 
introduction of new technologies and rapid evolution of institutional 
infrastructure in less than a decade.  Technological innovations facilitated a 
range of new services including cellular, digital wireless and satellite 
telephony. Introduction of these services accelerated the changes brought on 
by earlier innovations such as digital exchanges, microwave communications 
and led to rapid convergence of computer and communication technologies. 
The emergence of fiber optic networks facilitated the convergence among 
voice, data and video as well as introduction of other innovative services and 
led to formation of unimaginable capacity and created the potential for a vast 
array of new products.   
Technological progress reduced the extent of economies of scale in network 
construction and utilization, which allowed multiple players in the market.  
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This subsequently shrank the core of the natural monopoly. Therefore, 
duplicative investment argument in favor of natural monopoly has lost its 
validity in large parts of the sector.  Innovations such as microwave and 
satellite technologies made competition possible in service segments such as 
long-distance communication. A range of non-traditional players flocked into 
the traditionally monopolistic markets, and incumbents faced competitive 
pressures.  
 
The changes in the technology also triggered an unprecedented change in the 
institutional and regulatory arrangements within the industry. Although the 
seeds of change was embedded in earlier inspiring movements such as British 
Telecom privatization in the UK, and the deregulation experiment by the 
break up of the AT&T monopoly, it was not until mid 1990s that the change 
was embraced by a large group of countries. The telecommunication Act of 
1996 in US was an important cornerstone in deregulation of the sector and it 
contributed to the acceleration of deregulation and privatization of the state 
owned telephone monopolies around the world. 
 
While technological and institutional innovations facilitated access to the 
market, telecommunications industries have become increasingly capital 
intensive and required substantial amount of fixed investments. In the 
rapidly evolving global economy, telecommunications operators have to keep 
up with the needs of increasingly sophisticated users who demand low-cost, 
reliable and high-speed networks for transmitting data, voice, text and 
images.   
 
Intensifying competition and continued pressure on the firms to innovate and 
improve quality triggered a range of collaborative arrangements in the 
industry. Companies, long considered rivals, have courted each other  in 
order to join forces to compete in the new environment.   While some 
companies adopted pure play strategies by remaining focused in closely 
related products, technologies and markets, others pursued convergence 
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strategies by creating alliances across technologies, products and markets.  
They struggled to create value by controlling technology, increasing market 
access and gaining economies of scale.  
 
The waves of privatization and deregulation spanning a large number of 
countries not only attracted capital into local telecommunications but they 
also stimulated cross-border investments.  Throughout 1990s both Baby Bells 
of US and the national telephone companies of OECD countries were actively 
expanded their international presence through cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions and participation in telecom privatizations in foreign countries.  
Governments in all quarters of the world welcomed multinational telecom 
operators to expand and upgrade their existing networks.  Multilateral 
efforts, such as the Group of Basic Telecommunications (GBT) initiated by 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), further accelerated the momentum for 
reform and liberalization in telecommunications.  Initially 72 countries, 
including 42 developing economies, made commitments for privatization and 
liberalization of their telecommunication industries with various deadlines.  
In less than a decade, interaction of technological change and worldwide 
regulatory reform globalized what used to be a dominantly domestic industry.  
While environmental forces created incentives for internationalization, 
strategic and scale related factors prompted telecommunication firms to seek 
cross border opportunities proactively.  
Technological turbulence and changes in the regulatory environment 
discussed above amplified uncertainties and vulnerability of telecom service 
providers at their home markets and increased the attractiveness of the 
foreign markets. In this volatile transitional period, escalating competition 
and limited growth opportunities in traditionally protected markets and 
demand uncertainty in emerging product markets (internet services, wireless 
communications and a range of data services) as well as proliferation of 
competition brought international expansion to the forefront of strategic 
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considerations as an alternative to boost revenues and diffuse risks incurred 
at home markets. 
 
Sarkar et.al. (1999) argue that seeking access to international markets 
represents a way to move funds outside the regulated zone, and offer a 
potential to earn higher rates of return than rate of return regulated or price 
capped domestic markets1.  The threat of diverting funds from the local 
market could increase telecom companies’ bargaining power against the 
regulators.  In other words, in some cases international expansion is driven 
by the desire to alleviate regulatory pressures and to negotiate higher rates 
of return or price caps. 
Globalization of international production and central role played by 
communications technologies in this process increased the need to coordinate 
and integrate geographically dispersed operations of corporate clients. The 
configuration of multinational production networks created the opportunity 
to serve multinational customers across the markets by providing technically 
compatible service packages. At the same time, it made presence in multiple 
markets almost mandatory to win and retain large corporate accounts for 
telecommunication companies.  Telecom companies responded to this 
strategic imperative by providing customized communication services for the 
multinational networks such as establishing global private networks for their 
clients through dedicated lines and selling network maintenance and 
consulting services. These activities boosted the revenues, contributed to 
their capability to spot business development opportunities in foreign 
markets and increased their bargaining power in equipment procurements.    
 
Although the structure of the telecom markets was in shifting from monopoly 
towards competition, it still accommodated a relatively small number of 
                                                
1 Price and Star (1993) report that telecom operators privatized between 1985-1993 had an average 
annualized return of 20.8%, which is much higher than the returns earned by “rate of return” regulated 
US telecom operators.  
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players and only a limited number of international market opportunities 
contested.  This was particularly the case in many emerging markets, where 
telecommunications sector were being deregulated and privatized 
sequentially2.  In most cases, however, market opportunities were limited to a 
small number of successful bidders. This meant that companies that failed to 
gain access to the market at an early stage would be excluded from the 
market for a considerable period of time until the markets are fully 
liberalized. Even then, later entrants have difficult time in cracking the 
market as incumbents build barriers to entry despite liberalization and 
regulatory reform3. Thus, early and preemptive entry has potentially more 
value for telecom operators.  
 
 
International presence is likely to create certain systemic advantages in a 
technologically volatile industry as it facilitates formal and informal clout 
over institutions such as International Telecommunications Union, industry 
wide standard setting negotiation groups, and equipment manufacturers. 
Therefore, international presence is consistent with the search for systemic 
advantages for telecommunication companies 
 
Finally, telecommunication companies are motivated to seek international 
expansion to create input and output economies of scale.   The enhanced 
position in equipment purchases creates input scale economies.  The 
interconnected nature of the telecom networks creates output scale economies 
that arise due to traffic handling and capacity utilization (bandwidth, 
switching and administrative facilities) and allows network optimization that 
otherwise operated sub optimally under national constraints. It also creates 
the arbitrage possibility of carrying the traffic across the cheapest network.   
 
                                                
2 State owned national monopolies were privatized either in bundles or after unbundling and 
restructuring them along the market segments such as local loop, long distance, data and value added 
services. 
3 The experience of AT&T in Mexican long distance market demonstrated how difficult it could get to 
break the dominance of the incumbent’s hold in the market.  
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M&A Dynamics in the Telecommunications Industry 
Although mergers and acquisitions is a widely studied issue in corporate 
finance, corporate control issues in the regulated industries have not been 
fully explored.  The rapid transformation and the changing dynamics of the 
telecommunications industry as well as persisting role played by the policy 
makers suggests that corporate control is still an uncertain source of value 
for the companies.  The central role played by mergers and acquisitions in the 
evolution of the telecommunications industry justifies exploration of value 
and performance implications of these strategic moves.   
As it was discussed above, the main potential benefits of international 
acquisitions in telecommunications are the achievement of scale and scope 
economies, strategic advantages derived from preemptive market entry, 
systemic advantages amassed from international presence, opportunity to 
capitalize on the strategic interdependence, and regulatory arbitrage across 
regimes. The wealth implications will largely depend on the extent to which 
these benefits can be capitalized in international expansion through 
acquisitions. As it has been widely discussed in the M&A literature, 
acquisitions may also be potentially value destroying from the shareholder’s 
point of view because of agency problems, managerial hubris and lack of focus 
or diversification discount. In the context of telecommunications services, the 
value destruction can also be related to volatility of regulatory environment, 
failure to capitalize on prospective economies of scale, strategic advantages 
and disruptive technological innovations.  
The literature focusing in telecom mergers and acquisitions is not extensive. 
In the following section we will briefly review the findings of the relevant 
literature:  Wilcox et.al (2001) analyzed 44 transaction occurred between 
1996 and 1998.  Their event study results suggests that telecom mergers and 
acquisition activities resulted in significant increases in the market values of 
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the affected firms. They indicate that their results contradict with the earlier 
studies focusing on transactions involving information technology firms and 
they attribute this to the changing perception of the investors after the 1996 
Telecommunications act.  In another study focusing on European mergers 
and acquisitions between 1999 and 2000, Trillas (2002) reports 2.7% average 
abnormal stock returns in 12 acquisitions and is supported by a case study of 
Telefonica of Spain. The study concludes that there is no evidence of 
significantly positive average effect on acquirers’ market value of the 
completed transactions in the market for corporate control of European 
telecommunications firms. Trillas also notes that some potentially positive 
net present value acquisitions were stopped by political reasons. 
The current study will explore the value and performance implications by 
analyzing 100 acquisitions by US companies between 1985 and 2000.  
Data and Methodology 
Data 
 
Our search of newswires for cross-border telecom mergers and acquisitions 
revealed a total of 3609 transactions.  Out of these 3609 cases, 523 
transactions involved acquirers domiciled in the United States.  In 480 of the 
523 transactions acquirer name and industry could be identified.  Our 
screening of acquirers within SIC code 4813 produced 119 transactions. 
Among these 119 transactions, 110 revealed a disclosed transaction value. 
We further pursued this sample to compile accounting and share price data.  
Search and cross checks in DataStream revealed 35 transactions with share 
price data for the relevant period, and 64 transactions with relevant 
accounting data.  We used 35 transactions to conduct event studies to identify 
value implications of cross-border acquisitions announcements.  A second 
sample of 64 companies with workable accounting data was used to compare 
pre and post acquisition performance indicators. A list of companies in each 
sample was included in the appendix.  
 
 
 
Methodology:  
a. Event Study  
The event-study methodology is used in this study to examine the reaction of 
investors to acquisition announcements (also called events).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• [T0...T1] is estimation period:  typically 250 transaction days, but 
varies 180 to 250 days  In this study a 250 days of estimation window 
was used. 
• [T2...T3] is event window: Varies depending on the objective of the 
study and the accuracy of the announcement day, anywhere between 3 
days (-1 to +1)  to 60 were used in the literature  In our case we are 
confident that the announcements are recorded accurately, therefore 
we contemplated a 3 day event window, which is also consistent with  
the sprit of the event study methodology. 
• [T3...T4] is post event period: Varies depending on the objective of the 
study. In this study we used 12 and 24 month post event periods.  
 
The methodology is based on the assumption that capital markets are 
sufficiently efficient to evaluate the impact of new information (events) on 
expected future profits of the firms. It involves the following steps:  
• Identification of the events of interest and definition of the event 
window  
• Selection of the sample set of firms to include in the analysis; 
T3 
Post Event  
Period 
Estimation 
Period 
Event 
Date 
Event 
Window 
T0
0
T1 T2 T4
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• Prediction of a "normal" return during the event window in the 
absence of the event;  
• Estimation of the abnormal return within the event window, 
where the abnormal return is defined as the difference between 
the actual and predicted returns; and  
• Testing whether the abnormal return is statistically different from 
zero. Several methods may be used to obtain to estimate abnormal 
returns: the single-index model (constant mean return model), the 
market model and the capital asset price model (CAPM) are the 
most widely used methods. In this study market model was used to 
estimate the abnormal returns.  
 
The market model assumes a linear relationship between the return of any 
security to the return of the market portfolio: 
it i i mt tR Rα β ε= + + (1) 
with  E(eit)=0 and Var(eit)=σ2ei 
 
where  t is the time index, I=1,2, …….N  stands for security, Rit and Rmt are 
the returns on security i  and the market portfolio respectively, during period 
t ,and  tε is the error term for security i.  
Equation (1) is generally estimated over a period, which runs between 120 
and 250 days prior to the event up to a predetermined number of  days prior 
to the event. The event window is defined depending on the accuracy of 
announcement date and ranges from 3 days to as long as 60 days.  With the 
estimates of  α and β  from equation (1), one can predict a "normal" return 
during the days covered by the event window. The prediction error (the 
difference between the actual return and the predicted normal return), 
commonly referred to as the abnormal return (AR), is then calculated as: 
it it i i mtAR R Rα β= − + …………………(2) 
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For each individual event daily abnormal returns are calculated over the 
specified event window.  However, in order to draw overall inference on the 
abnormal return observations for the event(s) of interest, one can also 
aggregate the abnormal returns. .For a sample of N firms a daily average 
abnormal return (AR) for each day t is obtained: 
1
1 n
t it
i
AR AR
N =
= ∑           (3) 
 
The expected value of ARt is zero in the absence of abnormal performance. To 
examine whether the average daily abnormal return is statistically different 
from zero, the average standardized abnormal return (SARt) is calculated as: 
1
1 N it
t
i it
ARSAR
N S=
= ∑         (4) 
 
where Sit is the square root of firm i;s estimated forecast variance computed 
by  
 
2
1/ 22
2
1
(1 ){ [1 ]}
( )
mmt
it i T
mmk
k
R RS S
T R R
=
−
= + +
−∑
   (5) 
 
where Sj2 is the residual variance for security i from market model 
regression, T is the number of observations during the estimation period, Rmk 
is the return on market portfolio for the k-th day of the estimation period, Rmt 
is the return on the market portfolio for day t, and mR  is the average return 
on the market portfolio. Assuming that the individual abnormal returns are 
normal and independent across securities, the statistic Zt which follows a 
unit-normal distribution is used to test the hypothesis that the average 
standardized abnormal return equals zero where. 
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t tN SARZ =      (6) 
In order to test for the persistence of the impact of the event during a 
period 1 2( , )T T , the abnormal returns over the event window can be aggregated 
to obtain the cumulated abnormal returns 1 2( ( , ))iCAR T T   for security i  over 
the period 1 2( , )T T : 
2
1
1 2( , )
T
i it
t T
CAR T T AR
=
= ∑ ………(7) 
For a sample of N securities, the average cumulative abnormal return is calculated by  
( 1, 2) ( 1, 2)
1
1 N
T T T Ti
i
CAR CAR
N =
= ∑     (8) 
Finally a t-statistic is computed for the average CAR as: 
 
( 1, 2)
( 1, 2) / )(
T T
CAR T T
CARt
NS
=        (9) 
 
where   SCAR is the standard deviation of the cumulative abnormal returns over the event 
window, and N is the number of firms. The CARs are used to determine whether the 
decision taken by the firm had a material effect on the firm value. While positive CARs 
indicate that the equity market expects the acquisition to create value, negative CARs 
imply value destruction.  
 
b. Other Performance Metrics to be used in the Analysis 
In order to compare pre and post acquisition performance of the firm we used 
three widely used indicators: Operating Margin, Return on Assets and 
Tobin’s-q. 
 
The Operating Margin employed in this study was calculated as follows: 
 
t
t
t
EBITDOM
Sales
=      (10) 
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This ratio is based on the real cash earnings of a firm (Earnings Before 
Interest, Taxes and Depreciation-EBITD) and is neutral to differential 
accounting practices across firms, degree of leverage and tax treatments of 
assets.  It is particularly widely used in sectors that require large 
investments in infrastructure with long gestation period, which is consistent 
with the characteristics of the telecommunications industry.  
 
The second indicator, return on assets, is also based on the EBITD due to its 
neutrality to depreciation methods, leverage and tax treatment and measures 
pre and post acquisition efficiency of assets. If the expected synergies from 
acquisition are realized, asset efficiency of the company should improve. 
Return on Asset ratio employed in the analysis was calculated as follows: 
 
t
t
t
EBITDROA
TotalAssets
=      (11) 
 
 
Finally, the third indicator Tobin’s-Q  is defined as the ratio of market value 
of the firm to the replacement cost of its assets. We used Chung-Pruitt (1994) 
approximation to calculate the Q ratio: 
 
' tt
t
PS DEBTMVETobin s Q
TotalAssets
+ +
=−    (12) 
 
where MVE is the product of a firm’s share price and the number of 
outstanding common shares,  PS is the liquidating value of the firm’s 
outstanding preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the firm’s short term 
liabilities net of its short term assets, plus the book value of the firm’s long 
term debt, and TA is the book value of the total assets of the firm.  
Tobin’s Q an important and widely accepted measure of corporate 
performance. It has been employed to explain a number of diverse corporate 
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phenomena such as cross-sectional differences in investment and 
diversification decisions, the relationship between managerial equity 
ownership and firm value, relationship managerial performance and tender 
offer gains, investment opportunities and tender offer responses. In the 
context of this study, we use the Tobin’s-q to measure the effectiveness of the 
acquisition.  Doukas (1995) argue that international acquisitions can be 
construed as one-way managers spend cash instead of paying out to 
shareholders.  Therefore, declining q can be associated with overinvestment 
or investments in low benefit or value destroying projects.  An increase in 
Tobin’s q in the post acquisition period, on the other hand, implies value 
maximization.  
After computing the pre and post acquisition performance variables, we used  
the Mann-Whitney test (also known as Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test) of two 
medians as our principal method of testing for significant changes in the 
variables. More specifically we tested whether post acquisition cross-sectional 
sample medians are larger than the pre-acquisition cross-sectional sample 
medians. This procedure is the non-parametric counterpart of the equality of 
means for normal distributions.  The advantage of the test is that it does not 
require assumption of normality.   
 
Empirical Results 
 
Event Study Findings: 
In this study we analyzed 33 acquisitions made by US Telecommunication 
companies in 18 countries located in North America, Europe, Latin America 
and Asia Pacific.  While 15 of the target companies were domiciled in 
developed countries, 18 were located in Latin American and Asian emerging 
markets.   
 
Total value of acquisitions included in the sample was $12.3bn with a mean 
transaction value of  $363.8m.  Median, minimum and maximum transaction 
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values were reported in table-3 of the appendix.   Total dollar value of 
acquisition of targets in emerging markets exceeded the dollar value of 
acquisitions in developed markets. Average emerging market target 
acquisition was also larger than the developed country target acquisitions.  
 
The event study results of 33 cases suggest that on average cross-border 
acquisitions of US Telecommunication companies failed to create value for 
shareholders.  While average abnormal returns calculated on the day prior to 
the announcement (-1) and on the announcement day were negative, 
abnormal returns the day after the announcement day was positive (See 
table-4). In 42% of the transactions analyzed 42% of the abnormal returns 
were positive on day (-1) and day (0). The number of transactions with 
positive abnormal returns increased to 52% on event day (+1).  Cumulative 
abnormal returns over the event window proved to be positive but 
insignificant (see Table-4). A closer look at the abnormal returns reveals that 
maximum abnormal returns recorded on day (-1), announcement day and day 
(+1) were 3.7%, 9.5% and 20.2% respectively.   Average cross-sectional 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)  were 0.154%.  Maximum and 
minimum CARs across the companies were 79% and –15% respectively (See 
Table-5).  Roughly 51% of the CARs were positive.  
 
An analysis of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns based on 
the target location reveals an interesting pattern. On average Cumulative 
Abnormal returns are larger for emerging market acquisitions than the 
developed market acquisitions.  It is also more likely to observe a positive AR 
or CAR when the target is domiciled in an emerging market (see Tabel-6). 
However when differences tested they proved to be statistically insignificant. 
This result was also verified by a cross-sectional regression of CARs on the 
country dummy (see Table 7). 
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Pre and Post Acquisition Comparative Performance Metrics : 
A simple naked eye analysis of the performance measures reveals the 
following: Operating margin improved in 49.23% of the cases from pre-
acquisition year to the announcement year. The same number of positive 
changes were observed from pre-acquisition year to the year following the 
acquisition. The operating margin improvements declined to 40% when from 
pre-acquisition year to two years following the acquisition.  In 28% of the 
cases  performance increased in two of three years following the acquisition. 
Only 23% of the cases  revealed  three year improvements as compared to the 
pre-acquisition year (See table-10).  Similar ratios were observed for the 
Return on Asset measure.  Asset efficiency increased in more cases in the 
post acquisition year as compared to operating margin.  
The improvements in Tobin’s-q are dramatically different than the changes 
in the other two metrics. For instance in only 20% of the cases we observed 
an improvement in q from pre-acquisition year to post acquisition year.  
 
In order the test the statistical significance of these naked  eye observations 
reported  in Tables 10 and 11, we used Mann-Whitney test.  Test results 
revealed that observed changes were not statistically significant at 1, 5 and 
10% significance levels.    
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this study we analyzed the value and performance implications of cross-border 
acquisitions by US Telecommunications firms.  Our study was based on two relatively 
small samples. Sample analyses revealed that cross-border acquisitions of US Telecom 
companies on the average did not create value for the involved shareholders.  We also 
could not identify any significant performance improvements.  On the surface the results 
of the study is consistent with the earlier findings reported in the  finance literature where 
bidding firms are consistently associated with value destruction.  Some studies attribute 
value destruction to loss of focus, and relate the negative acquisition premiums to 
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diversification effect. In more recent studies, it was reported that cross border 
(geographic acquisitions) with focus were more likely to create value (Bodnar et al 2001). 
Our study results cannot verify this conclusion as our sample represents focused 
acquisitions in a narrow industrial segment.  
 
The results of this study should be generalized with great caution for a number of 
reasons. First, small sample size does not allow us to make general statements about the 
findings, and empirical patterns. Second, two samples used in the study introduces a 
survival bias. Survivor firms that seldom became targets themselves dominate the event 
study sample. The performance sample includes a number of firms that became 
acquisition targets or bankrupted. 
 
Finally, to improve the external validity of the study, empirical analysis should be 
expanded with a larger sample. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table-1a: Event Study Sample 
Acquirer Name  
US Sprint Communications Co MCI Communications Corp 
Southwestern Bell Corp Telegroup Inc 
American Telephone & Telegraph Southwestern Bell Corp 
NYNEX Corp AT&T Corp 
Pittencrieff Communications Tyco Submarine Systems Ltd 
Pacific Telesis Group Primus Telecommunications 
Nextel Communications Inc BellSouth Corp 
Nextel Communications Inc BellSouth Corp 
Southwestern Bell-Cellular Op Sprint PCS 
Southwestern Bell Corp Centennial Cellular Corp 
AirTouch Communications Inc Primus Telecommunications 
AT&T Corp AT&T Latin America 
Southwestern Bell Corp Viatel Inc 
Southwestern Bell Corp Startec Global Communications 
McCaw International(Nextel Co) BellSouth Corp 
AirTouch Communications Inc BellSouth Corp 
BellSouth Corp 8x8 Inc 
Nextel Communications Inc Covad Communications Group Inc 
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Table-1b: Event Study Parameters  
Event Date MM-Start MM-End
# Trading 
Days 
Event 
Start 
Event 
End 
Event 
Window 
10/11/1990 10/11/89 09/27/90 250 10/10/90 10/12/90 3
10/11/1990 10/11/89 09/27/90 250 10/10/90 10/12/90 3
01/07/1993 01/09/92 12/24/92 250 01/06/93 01/08/93 3
10/22/1993 10/23/92 10/08/93 250 10/21/93 10/25/93 3
01/17/1994 06/23/93 01/03/94 142 01/14/94 01/18/94 3
03/31/1994 01/04/93 03/17/94 250 03/30/93 04/01/94 3
06/06/1994 06/07/93 05/23/94 250 06/03/94 06/07/94 3
10/11/1994 10/12/93 09/27/94 250 10/10/94 10/12/94 3
10/24/1994 10/25/93 10/10/94 250 10/21/94 10/25/94 3
01/12/1995 12/16/93 12/01/94 250 12/14/94 12/16/94 3
02/07/1995 02/08/94 01/24/95 250 02/06/95 02/08/95 3
08/07/1995 08/04/95 08/07/95 250 08/08/94 07/24/95 3
07/10/1996 07/12/95 06/26/96 250 07/09/96 07/10/96 3
11/08/1996 08/19/96 10/24/96 48 11/07/96 11/11/96 3
12/23/1996 12/25/95 12/06/96 250 12/20/96 12/24/96 3
09/05/1997 09/05/96 08/22/97 250 09/04/97 09/08/97 3
07/29/1998 07/29/97 07/14/98 250 07/28/98 07/30/98 3
08/06/1998 08/07/97 07/22/98 250 08/05/98 08/09/98 3
11/16/1998 11/14/97 10/30/98 250 11/13/98 11/17/98 3
01/05/1999 01/05/98 12/21/98 250 01/04/99 01/06/99 3
05/19/1999 05/19/98 05/04/99 250 05/18/99 05/20/99 3
05/31/1999 05/29/98 05/14/99 250 05/28/99 06/01/99 3
10/01/1999 10/01/98 09/16/99 250 09/30/99 10/04/99 3
11/16/1999 11/16/98 11/01/99 250 11/15/99 11/17/99 3
12/17/1999 12/17/96 12/02/97 250 12/16/99 12/18/99 3
01/17/2000 01/29/99 12/31/99 250 01/14/00 01/18/00 3
02/08/2000 02/09/99 02/24/00 250 02/07/00 02/09/00 3
02/24/2000 02/24/99 02/09/00 250 02/23/00 02/25/00 3
02/29/2000 03/01/99 02/14/00 250 02/28/00 03/01/00 3
03/30/2000 03/31/99 03/15/00 250 03/29/00 03/31/00 3
05/05/2000 5/26/1999 04/20/00 250 05/04/00 05/08/00 3
05/25/2000 05/26/99 05/10/00 250 05/24/00 05/26/00 3
06/30/2000 07/01/99 06/15/00 250 06/29/00 07/03/00 3
08/11/2000 03/25/99 07/27/00 250 08/10/00 08/14/00 3
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Table-2: Performance Study Sample 
 
 
Acquirer Name 
Millicom Inc Andrew Corp 
Pacific Telesis Group AT&T Corp 
Pacific Telesis Group ADC Telecommunications Inc 
Atlantic Tele-Network Co MCI Communications Corp 
Park Communications Inc ADC Telecommunications Inc 
Able Telcom Holding Corp Itron Inc 
GTE Corp Computron Software Inc 
Cognitronics Corp Sitel Corp 
IDB Communications Group Inc Aspect Telecommunications 
Digital Equipment Corp United International Holdings 
Able Telcom Holding Corp GST Telecommunications Inc 
Starter Corporation AirTouch Communications Inc 
NYNEX Corp Cincinnati Bell Inc 
Bell Atlantic Corp AirTouch Communications Inc 
Geotek Communications Inc Bell Atlantic Corp 
LCI International Inc LCC International Inc 
Pittencrieff Communications BellSouth Corp 
Geotek Communications Inc Tellabs Inc 
Datatec Systems Inc P-COM Inc 
Motorola Inc Caribiner International Inc 
AirTouch Communications Inc COMSAT Corp 
AirTouch Communications Inc SBC Communications Inc 
Nextel Communications Inc Automatic Data Processing Inc 
Motorola Inc Automatic Data Processing Inc 
Nextel Communications Inc Medialink Worldwide Inc 
Nextel Communications Inc Motorola Inc 
AirTouch Communications Inc Nextel Communications Inc 
GTE Telephone Operations United International Holdings 
United International Holdings Sitel Corp 
AirTouch Communications Inc Brightpoint Inc 
DSP Communications Inc P-COM Inc 
GST Telecommunications Inc AirTouch Communications Inc 
Harris Corp  
  
 
 
 
 
Table-3: Event Study Sample Characteristics 
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 Total 
In Emerging 
Markets 
In Developed 
Markets 
Number of Acquisitions 33 18 15 
Value (million $) $12,370.80 $7422.3 4948.5 
Mean Value (million$) 363.8 218.3 141.4 
Median  (million $) 136.7 20.5 .0 
STD (million $) 626.624364 496.0628 454.3338 
 
Table-4:  Summary of ARs  and  SARs over the event window. 
 Mean Median % Positive Z-Value/t-Value 
AR(-1) -0.0068 -0.0062 42% 0.22 
AR(0) -0.0012 -0.0033 42% -0.04 
AR(+1) 0.0097 0.0004 52% -0.43 
SAR(-1) 0.0390 -0.0191 42%  
SAR(0) -0.0066 -0.0106 42%  
SAR(+1) -0.0745 0.0025 52%  
CAR(-1,1) 0.0015 -0.0013 51% 0.148 
 
Table-5: Maximum and Minimum AR s during the event window      
 Max  Min 
AR(-1) 0.037 -0.075 
AR(0) 0.095 -0.080 
AR(+1) 0.202 -0.073 
SAR(-1) 1.675 -0.707 
SAR(0) 0.387 -0.274 
SAR(+1) 0.599 -0.507 
CAR(-1,+1) 0.794 -0.150 
SCAR)-1,+1) 0.794 -1.219 
 
 
Table-6:  Differential Abnormal Returns in Acquisition of Targets in 
Emerging and Developed Countries 
 
Developed 
Target %Positive
Emerging
Target %Positive
AR(-1) -0.0036 40% -0.0030 44% 
AR(0) -0.0037 40% 0.0025 50% 
AR(+1) 0.0626 33% 0.0452 67% 
SAR(-1) -0.0372 40% 0.0750 44% 
SAR(0) -0.0062 40% -0.0002 50% 
SAR(+1) -0.0197 33% -0.0526 67% 
SCAR -0.0359 33% 0.0124 67% 
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Table-7: Emerging Developed AR Differences 
 AR(Emerging-Developed)  Z-Stat  
AR(-1) 0.0006  0.0018  
AR(0) 0.0063  0.0179  
AR(+1) -0.0174  -0.0498  
SAR(-1) 0.1122  0.3209  
SAR(0) 0.0060  0.0172  
SAR(+1) -0.0330  -0.0943  
SCAR 0.0483  0.1381  
 
Table-8:  Cumulative Return Regression Output: 
(Independent Variables Country Dummy and Transaction Size) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.055917 0.056620 -0.987584 0.3313 
EMG 0.110385 0.108580 1.016616 0.3175 
TRNSC -7.67E-05 6.83E-05 -1.123334 0.2702 
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Table-10: Performance Changes: Pre-Acquisition and Post-Acquisition 
Periods   
 
 (-1) to (0) (-1) to (+1) (-1) to (+2) Two Years Three Years
Operating Margin 32 32 26 18 15
% 49.23% 49.23% 40.00% 27.69% 23.08%
ROA 32 38 28 17 16
% 49.23% 58.46% 43.08% 26.15% 24.62%
Tobin-q 7 13 11 6 5
% 10.77% 20.00% 16.92% 9.23% 7.69%
 
 
Table-11:  Summary Statistics for Performance Measures 
 (-1) 0 (+1) (+2) 
Operating Margin    
# of Companies 62 63 65 45 
Mean (%) -47.2399 -23.29273 -6.657969 2.1321778 
Median (%) 18.7465 20.166 18.808 18.767 
Max (%) 45.365 50.449 50.449 51.201 
Min (%) -1257.37 -1136.826 -830.558 -154.384 
STD (%) 241.736 181.69188 111.41649 45.925458 
     
ROA     
# of Companies 62 63 65 46 
Mean (%) -1.46394 1.4790952 -0.625431 -1.857522 
Median (%) 4.1015 3.876 2.338 3.464 
Max (%) 59.844 39.324 39.324 15.591 
Min (%) -212.13 -56.174 -38.331 -34.009 
STD (%) 30.6958 12.971217 13.140827 12.640214 
     
Tobin's-q     
# of Companies 51 54 55 38 
Mean 9.21498 5.729852 4.0526791 3.0324615 
Median 4.33357 2.9060228 2.5590311 2.3798624 
Max 99.5087 65.593089 16.254948 7.6786614 
Min 0.06559 0.0655883 0.0655883 0.2546963 
STD 16.7 9.6692347 3.8603736 2.1420998 
 
